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Dispatch No. OIZA-244

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To : Chief, SE

Date 6 January 1953

FROM : []

SUBJECT: GENERAL- SHAM/BGFIEND/PSYCH
SPECIFIC- BGFIEND/Rome Monthly Survey Report
28 November, 1952 to 6 January, 1953

1. This report is twenty-one days late because [] wished to make it a resume of his two years' experience with VALUABLE-BGFIEND/HTNEIGH. [] arrived in Rome 6 January 1951). Thus, this report does not deal with day-to-day matters, which are going along in their usual fashion, but attempts instead to deal with the broad problem of the VALUABLE-BGFIEND/HTNEIGH overall political situation as seen by the writer after his two years in this activity.

2. Before proceeding to the report, which is attached as an appendix and is entitled, "A Review of VALUABLE-BGFIEND/HTNEIGH Political Situation", [] would like to make the following comments:

At times the writer is stunned by the cross currents, or forces of discord, which pervade HTNEIGH. It seems that, no matter what the magnitude of any given problem (or activity), some pressure group, impelled by some unworthy purpose, invariably arises. Almost without exception, these groups are seeking (1) individual gain for themselves, or (2) to improve the political fortunes of their political party, or (3) to block what they believe to be a personal (or political) gain for certain of their associates. Usually, such coalitions are formed to block imaginary advantages envisioned for an associate (3 above).

More often, however, XNMALEDICT represents the opposition to any solution which would benefit HTNEIGH as a whole. Theirs is a program designed to wear down the opposition while strengthening their own party position a bit at a time as a result of the failures manifested by their brothers-in-arms, with whom they must mingle to afford their very own existence.

Such a policy may well sweep all concerned down the drain, but such a possibility appears to be of little concern to the XNMALEDICTS. The XNMALEDICTS realize they have only one chance of attaining their goal --

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they must ride into office under the auspices of an HTNEIGH so demoralized as a body that out of its embers only XNMALEDICT can arise quickly to seize control of the country.

Therefore, the only real dangers to the XNMALEDICTS (as they view the situation) is their ejection from HTNEIGH or a transfer of HTCURIO support to elements outside HTNEIGH. As a consequence, each and every act performed by the XNMALEDICTS is calculated to make the maximum gain possible in attaining their ends but without going so far as to precipitate a crisis which would cause their expulsion from HTNEIGH or a transfer of HTCURIO backing to elements outside XNMALEDICT's influence.

While the writer is overwhelmed by the sinister forces which pervade HTNEIGH, he is even more astonished by the lack of resistance to these forces. Even though members of HTNEIGH are well aware that certain acts performed by the pressure groups will result in a further deterioration of HTNEIGH and their own political fortunes, they will, time after time, combine to block a worthwhile accomplishment because they fear that someone else might benefit to a greater degree than they personally would benefit. Here are two recent examples to illustrate this point --

[] knows that the XNMALEDICTS have no real love for him. He knows they only treat him with deference at this time because his strength cannot be ignored. He also knows that the XNMALEDICT PROGRAM IS BASED UPON THE "divide and conquer" theory and that their present aim is to liquidate the Lorton A. Tewell forces, after which they will dispose of Ockleshaw. Even knowing this, Ockleshaw joined the XNMALEDICTS in blocking the entry into HTNEIGH of independent elements from outside, which would have strengthened both Ockleshaw's and Tewell's position, not only within HTNEIGH, but throughout KMWAHOO circles.

It is fairly obvious that RNCASTING intends to pick up the forces needed to liberate and/or govern KMWAHOO, a piece at a time. His has also been a program of "divide and conquer", but recently he extended an olive branch which all members of HTNEIGH should have been eager to grab. RNCASTING sent a message to Rome, imploring all KMWAHOOOS to forget their past grievances and unite in an allout effort to free their homeland from the BGGYPSIES. Here was an opportunity for HTNEIGH to promote its best interests by attempting to gather the elements upon whom both the TPROACHES and RNCASTING would have to depend, if not to overthrow the present government, certainly to rule the country in harmony after its liberation. However, Lorton A. Tewell joined with the XNMALEDICT in voting against even the reproduction of RNCASTING's message in the pages of QKPALING solely out of his deep seated hatred for RNCASTING.

The writer is moved to remark that HTNEIGH seems to differ little in its political practices from the foolhardy shenanigans indulged in by the French. The XNMALEDICTS can be likened to the de Gaullists in that their sole aim is to capture the government regardless of the welfare of the people.

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The opposition (Ockleshaw and Tewell) behave much like the anti-de Gaullists, who should unite for their common good but refuse to do so because they fear they might not receive their just portion of the fruits to be derived from such a coalition.

If the writer sounds cynical, he would like to correct the impression. It is only that after two years of experience he would like to see HTNEIGH move forward as the force visualized when it was conceived or be brought under complete control to perform the functions required of it by the HTCURIOS to attain their objective.

3. With these thoughts in mind, [] wrote the afore-mentioned review of the VALUABLE-BGFIEND/HTNEIGH political situation, embodying certain suggestions, which he asks higher authority to consider as a political blue print in governing our foreseeable dealings with the KMWAAHOO problem. With the exception of Recommendations 5. and 7. on page 9 of this review, [] has discussed all phases of the recommendations made with []. He believes he can state [] is in complete concurrence with these recommendations.

4. Also attached is a report from the Secretary, HTNEIGH, of activities conducted by that group during the period 10 November - 10 December 1952.

[]

Attachments: (s.c.)

1. A Review of VALUABLE-BGFIEND/HTNEIGH Political Situation
2. Analysis of HTNEIGH Personnel - Appendix to Attachment No. 1
3. HTNEIGH Monthly Report

Distribution:

- 1/2 - Addressee
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Attachment to OIZA-244, No. 1

A REVIEW OF VALUABLE-BGFIEND/NCEA POLITICAL SITUATION

It is difficult to isolate the Committee for Free Albania from VALUABLE-BGFIEND and view it as an autonomous body. Much of what NCEA does, or does not do, is often the result of its misconceived (almost always) determination of ZRCROWN-PBPRIME intentions. This misconception is apparently an age-old Albanian characteristic. The Albanian line of reasoning seldom varies. It can be described this way: "If the ZRCROWN-PBPRIMES said 'this', they really meant 'that'. I can best capitalize on their intentions by following such-and-such a course of action." Unfortunately for the Albanians, their reasoning is usually fallacious, because it doesn't consider the PBPRIME-ZRCROWNS interests. It is nearly always based solely upon what the Albanians see from the standpoint of their own interests.

NCEA's attitude (and actions) is further influenced by unintentional, or intentional, meddling by the ZRCROWNS. For example, as you know, Vasil Andoni, Secretary of the Balli Kombetar Party but not even a member of NCEA's executive body, recently wrote to his brother Alfred, who is employed by the British Broadcasting Company in London, requesting that he call upon Mightly and determine whether or not Messrs. RNLUMPIT and [] in Rome really express the wishes of London and Washington. Mightly's answer (recorded in memorandum form) was fine - up to a point. But when he ended by stating that London would send a representative from London to Rome to handle the matter, at least for the ZRCROWNS, he simply nullified months of work done by RNLUMPIT and []

In effect, Mightly gave the Albanians, those who opposed the reorganization and broadening of NCEA, a new lease on life; all they had to do was reach a stalemate with the Rome ZRCROWN/PBPRIMES and, in due course, a fresh team of representatives would be assigned to the political front. Even more important is the attitude now prevailing in NCEA circles, as the result of this statement by Mightly, that perhaps the new men will be of a more malleable character.

Thus, in reviewing the current situation prevailing within NCEA, the writer feels it necessary to discuss VALUABLE-BGFIEND political activities as well.

CURRENT SITUATION NCEA/VALUABLE-BGFIEND POLITICAL FRONT

Despite periodic grumblings from these quarters, NCEA is serving its needs (for the moment) at a pace consistent with present ZRCROWN-PBPRIME demands. While NCEA might well improve its own fortunes by entering into certain activities, i.e., broaden its body to include a higher percentage of its countrymen, make a strenuous effort to effect a liaison or an amalgamation with Yugoslav elements, conduct recruiting drives, etc., the fact remains that it is fairly well patterned to present ZRCROWN/PBPRIME needs.

The real dangers, as the writer sees them lie ahead in the period when liberation operations are undertaken, regardless of whether such operations are staged by forces supported by NCEA or otherwise. It is with the preparation for that period that the writer is concerned at the moment. It is with these possible dangers in mind that the current situation is herewith examined:

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1. The NCEA leaders cannot agree to broaden their executive body to admit elements outside NCEA, although they would gladly accept a reorganization of their committee from within its present membership.

2. The writer is reluctant to see any major reorganization along the lines acceptable to NCEA because he believes such a reorganization would only strengthen certain elements within NCEA seeking to tighten their holds on Committee functions. He also believes such a reorganization would result in needless increased expense to the PBPRIMES, who carry practically the entire cost burden (Rome political and propaganda operations) as it is.

3. If RNLUMPIT reflects the thinking of London, the ZRCROWNS appear very anxious to broaden and reorganize NCEA. RNLUMPIT has even queried [] as to how the latter would feel about fomenting trouble within the Balli Kombetar ranks in a move to force the resignation of the professor group from the NCEA. (Hasan Dosti, NCEA Chairman and President of Balli Kombetar, stated, some months ago, his willingness to split the Balli Kombetar Party and merge its conservative elements with those of the Beys, now led by Ali Klissura. He now admits that time would be required to organize the split, whereas some months ago he felt it could be accomplished quickly.)

In summary, RNLUMPIT and [] are agreed that, insofar as they are jointly concerned, the ZRCROWN-PBPRIMES are faced with the following alternatives in the political handling of NCEA:

A. Continue with the NCEA as it is;

B. Destroy the present Committee and form a new one; or

C. Foment trouble in the ranks of the Balli Kombetar and force the resignation of the professors, who constitute the major source of trouble for the ZRCROWN-PBPRIMES by refusing to reshape NCEA to meet future ZRCROWN-PBPRIME needs.

The writer believes, however, that there are other alternatives which should be studied but that such alternatives concern the PBPRIMES alone. He also believes that now is the opportune time to study such alternatives, first, because both the ZRCROWNS and the Albanians are wary of the new "line", or policy, which may emerge from Washington as a result of a new administration, and, second, because the Americans are marking time at the moment on the NCEA/VALUABLE-FIEND political front in an effort further to clarify ZRCROWN-Yugoslav intentions toward Albania.

A REVIEW OF NCEA/VALUABLE-BGFIEND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

Why the NCEA-VALUABLE/BGFIEND Activity?

The answer to this question is obvious, but it is apparent that confusion exists as to the exact end results desired by the three participants involved. Let us examine the three forces collectively and individually, that is, the ZRCROWNS, the PBPRIMES, the Albanians. One must start with the true aims of the three partners. In the writer's opinion, these can be summarized as follows:

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The ZRCROWNS: Represent a shrinking empire in which limbs are being amputated a piece at a time. During the operation a ferocious struggle is carried on by the patient to retain her possessions (influence over areas which have heretofore been friendly toward her.) She is not primarily concerned with Albania's liberation; her primary concern is to establish a regime friendly toward her which she can control politically, economically, and militarily.

The Albanians: Represent interests whose primary aims are (1) the return of their holdings and their positions of prominence within the Albania of tomorrow, or (2) to establish themselves in positions of power upon their return to Albania (the have-nots who came into prominence in exile).

The PBPRIMEs: Desire the liberation of Albania but so far have not attempted to promote their own best interests - the establishment of a government friendly toward PBPRIME which could be counted upon to side with PBPRIME in any eventuality.

What are the Dangers in Such a Partnership?

With three such divergent aims, the partnership is fraught with dangers.

The ZRCROWNS seek to influence individuals and individual political parties. Theirs is a program of opportunism in which policy is shifted constantly to curry favor with those individuals or groups who it appears will be in positions of power in post-liberated Albania.

Thus, Said Kryeziu, who was placed in the Committee originally at the request of the ZRCROWNS because they thought his brother Gani was still alive in Jugoslavia and might one day be of use to them on that front, lost favor when it became known that Gani was dead.

The Balli Kombetar was utilized extensively because it could supply high calibre agents, or, rather, could supply higher calibre agents than the other exile forces associated with the ZRCROWN-PBPRIMEs. For almost two years a strenuous effort was made by the ZRCROWNS to promote the Balli Kombetar organization as the future government. Now, with Yugoslavia taking a prominent role in Albanian affairs, via the Prizren Committee, the ZRCROWNS appear to be attempting to relegate the Balli Kombetar to a less important role than that seemingly planned for them two years ago and now seek to curry favor with Abaz Kupa and the **BKI**.

Apparently, the ZRCROWNS feel that Abaz Kupa and the **BKI** will play important roles in any invasion of Albania staged from Yugoslav soil. For this reason, the ZRCROWNS (again RNLUMPIT) **are now demanding the entry of the BKI into NCEA** and are attempting to establish a more friendly relationship with Abaz Kupa.

The Albanians present dangers which can be classified as follows:

1. An attempt is made at all times to capitalize on the apparent divergencies in the ZRCROWN-PBPRIME aims.
2. PBPRIME support is being used by the Balli Kombetar to organize itself as a future government of Albania. Similar support is being used by Said Kryeziu's

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Peasants & Farmers League to build its forces into a political entity to combat the efforts of the Balli Kombetar. The PBPRIME support given the Legalitet Movement is being used for a dual purpose - an effort on the one hand to build a stronger political party, in numbers, at least, than that of the Balli Kombetar, and an effort, on the other hand, to increase the prestige of the individual chieftains who make up the Central Committee of the party. The latter is being done for the purpose of fitting themselves into any form of governmental establishment which might emerge as a result of the Balli Kombetar activity, the Prizren Committee activity, or the return of ex-King Zog.

3. In spite of these basic differences, there is a unified effort on the part of these divergent groups within NCFa to hamstring their PBPRIME backers to the degree that PBPRIME backing will be funneled through the hands of the privileged few who can demand political allegiance from those Albanians who would participate in the country's liberation. Thus, with the possible exception of Said Kryeziu, who sees safety in numbers, blocking the entry into the Committee of any Albanian who might share in the PBPRIME backing and detract from their own individual glitter is of paramount importance to the small clique which now controls the Albanian forces with whom we deal.

The PBPRIMES appear to be pursuing a policy which is too honorable and which may well result in a "me too" philosophy in the unforeseeable future. This is likely because, in our sincere desire to liberate Albania, we PBPRIMES are often prone to overlook the selfish aims of both the ZRCROWNS and the Albanians. This oversight encourages the ZRCROWNS and the Albanians to take advantage of us.

The writer believes the ZRCROWNS reason that we will support any group which emerges as the dominating force. Meanwhile, the ZRCROWNS policy calls for being in the camp of that force before it assumes the position of dominance. We are also hindered by the ZRCROWNS because we are saddled with a joint policy at the Albanian political level in which nearly all HTCURIO political-propaganda funds, though channeled through PBPRIME hands, are jointly administered, at least in principle. In other words, while the HTCURIO alone, theoretically administers its political and propaganda funds, all NCFa employees must be acceptable to the ZRCROWNS, as well as to the Albanians and the PBPRIMES.

The Albanians believe, as the ZRCROWNS do, that the PBPRIMES will support the dominating force, but they also believe something else of even more importance to themselves. They believe the PBPRIMES will care for them as individuals because the PBPRIMES have demonstrated clearly that they will not forsake their friends when their positions of prestige are lowered. Witness the cases of Said Kryeziu, Ihsan Toptani, and Muharrem Bajraktari. At one time or another the PBPRIMES have stood by all of these individuals when their associates would expel them from their midst or, as in the case of Said Kryeziu, when even the ZRCROWNS desired his resignation from NCFa.

It must, therefore, be summarized that this association is filled with dangers and allows a workable coalition only because of the one thing which all three parties desire -- wresting Albania from the control of the Kremlin.

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WHY CONTINUE SUCH AN ASSOCIATION?

The foregoing being true, it is only logical that we ask ourselves why we should continue such an association. In the writer's opinion, there are a number of good reasons. For one thing, the association would appear to warrant a continuation because of the fact, if for no other reason, that the organization furnishes a facade behind which the PBPRIMES can operate in the conduct of their campaign to bring about the defeat of Communism.

Another reason of paramount importance is the fact that out of this organization may well come a nucleus around which PBPRIME-supported forces might stage an invasion (or part of an invasion) of Albania. Another is the fact that some non-operational elements (radio broadcasters, newspaper editors, etc.) can be recruited through this machine to assist the PBPRIMES in their conduct of activities done in the name of NCTA.

Of even greater importance, from the writer's point of view, however, is the fact that PBPRIME control of important exile elements may give PBPRIME a strong bargaining position if it becomes advisable at some future date to attempt a merger of PBPRIME interests with those of Tito.

But while the writer is convinced that a continuation of the NCTA/VALUABLE-BGFIEND political venture is a worthwhile activity, he is likewise of the opinion that serious consideration should be given to some sweeping modifications in the association. The real problem, it would appear, is to examine the association with a view toward getting greater benefits for the PBPRIMES in the end result.

HOW CAN PBPRIME OBTAIN THESE BENEFITS?

This is an effort to furnish some material for study from which a blueprint for political activities guidance can be derived. If the ZRCROWNS are seeking to use PBPRIME support to gain favor for the ZRCROWNS alone, then we must take steps to counteract such activities. If the Albanians use PBPRIME support to further a program which is not in keeping with PBPRIME's best interests and desires, then effective counter-measures must be taken against the Albanians. And....the counter-measures in both instances should represent the maximum measures which can be taken without jeopardizing the benefits to be realized from such associations.

With this view in mind, the writer proposes the following steps be given consideration by higher authority:

1. Alter the PBPRIME policy to extend beyond Albania's actual liberation. Let the HECURIO take the leadership in the political field to establish Albania's next government. While this may represent a drastic change in KUBARK's charter, the fact should not be overlooked that the ZRCROWN QKFERVOR, with which we work, apparently places this aim above all others.

2. Adopt a more realistic view in our dealings with the Albanians. After two years' association with these elements the writer is convinced that almost without exception the political exiles with whom we work are concerned primarily with their own welfare and spend much of their time endeavoring to discover ways and means of exploiting their association with the PBPRIMES. Let us be fair in our dealings, but let us be firm in putting a halt to any abuses growing out of

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our relationship, and let us make it clear that we place PBPRIME's interests above all others. Thus, when any element (or elements) are caught in a double-cross, let us take firm measures against the guilty immediately, even though such measures may result in expelling the guilty from the ranks of NCEA.

3. Revise the administering of welfare funds and subsidies to obtain the maximum benefits for the PBPRIMES. It is obvious that the political leaders who administer the monthly welfare fund do not look upon it as a welfare fund at all. They regard it as a subsidy, and they use it, not as a PBPRIME subsidy, but as a means of strengthening the allegiance of their own followers and would-be followers. An analysis of the monthly welfare fund shows that approximately 85.6% of the fund represents nothing more than payments being made on this basis by Abaz Kupi, Abas Ermenji, and Said Kryeziu, to their respective henchmen. The balance, of only 14.4%, can be classed as welfare, but what portion of that is spent to impress the PBPRIMES with the Committee's concern for its suffering countrymen, and what portion actually reaches the truly needy, is highly problematical.

Thus, the writer offers this proposal:

A. Throw all funds, both welfare and subsidies, into one pot insofar as our support of various elements is concerned.

B. Group all Albanians into four categories:

- (1) Politicians having present or future value.
- (2) Able bodied and competent workmen (propagandists, agents, etc.) having immediate and/or future value.
- (3) Chieftains and lieutenants being subsidized by political leaders.
- (4) Welfare cases genuinely in need of help and where such help would enhance PBPRIME prestige, or cases where it would be to NCEA's good to render assistance.

C. Determine the individual worth of the group (1) politicians. Add to this sum a set subsidy allowance for the group (3) chieftains and lieutenants coming under the control of the various individual politicians, and give that lump sum to the individual political leader with the understanding that: it is an outright subsidy to be dispersed as he sees fit; we require no accounting other than a list of the chieftains and lieutenants he subsidizes; and the fund will be continued only so long as we are satisfied with his, and their, behavior toward us. (Several members of the Consultative Committee who are illiterate would be included in this group. Such elements would be paid as individuals by NCEA out of New York just as they have been in the past, but their political chieftains would be made to understand that such payments were considered a part of their own subsidies, since they appointed the individuals.)

Such deals would be made individually with the various political leaders by [] and [] can assure the reader that such deals would remain secret because financial gain is the one department in which secrecy is maintained by Albanians.

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Such subsidies would not only shift the burden of blame from FBPRIME shoulders to those of the political leaders (many Albanians are now told by the political leaders that the FBPRIMES control the welfare fund and that, while they personally would like to help the needy, the FBPRIMES will not allow them to do so) but would allow us to exercise more control over the politicians, determine the amount of their individual subsidies (instead of allowing them to split the kitty), and be selective in determining whom we will, and whom we will not, support.

Under this plan there would be only a slight increase in the overall amount now being paid to the NCEA in subsidies and welfare. The slight margin would be the result of a step-up in Abaz Kupi's and Said Kryeziu's subsidies. [] recommends this only because Kupi and Kryeziu are at a financial disadvantage due to party membership dues collected regularly by the professors and used to promote their interests to the detriment of the other parties within NCEA. The writer would analyze the accounts to determine that portion of all expenditures which could be classed as subsidies and would use that figure, plus Kupi's and Kryeziu's increased subsidies, as a control. (This analysis has been made and is attached as an appendix).

✓ D. Administer the welfare fund on a direct aid basis. Under the present system those Albanians who do receive welfare aid receive it at the discretion of the central committees of the three political parties active in NCEA affairs. (This does not include the \$500 fund distributed in Greece, which has been kept out of the hands of the politicians.) This is the result of a private deal made among the political leaders, under the terms of which Balli Kombetar takes \$1,000, the Legalitet Movement \$1,000, and Said Kryeziu the remaining \$500 of the \$2500 fund appropriated by the FBPRIMES each month. Thus, the central committee of each party then decides who among their membership will receive aid, either as a subsidy or for actual welfare. Unfortunately, as already stated, only about 14.4% of this amount is used for what could be termed welfare in the broadest sense.

It would be the writer's suggestion that this system be superseded by the following plan. After subsidies have been weeded out of the welfare fund, and the political leaders have been subsidized as per the plan outlined in C. above, [] would withhold the balance of the \$2,500 to be administered directly by himself on an individual case basis. For example, any Albanian exile could appeal to NCEA for aid just as in the past; the case would be placed before [] by the Committee and he would decide upon the merits of the case. The Albanian seeking aid would not find it necessary to swear allegiance to one of the political parties before receiving financial aid.

The writer would propose to employ an Italian at a salary not to exceed \$150 per month (he would also be used for other duties), who would make the necessary investigations upon which [] could base his decisions and handle the distribution of funds directly so that the recipient would be aware of the fact that he or she was under no obligation to any political party or leader. This system would also eliminate kick-backs, which [] feels sure are being made under the present system. Best of all, however, is the fact that it would make the recipients more friendly toward their benefactors, the FBPRIMES.

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E. Place all able-bodied and competent workmen having immediate and/or future value (propagandists, agents, etc., described above) on a pay-as-you-work basis.

At the moment we have approximately 53 men in this category who are receiving support from us through one means or another, i.e., standbys, political subsidies (welfare fund), or as members of NCFA's Consultative Committee, which has never held a formal meeting in the more than three years of NCFA's existence. Of this number only 17 contribute anything to NCFA by the stretch of greatest imagination. The balance do nothing other than consult with their political leaders and sip coffee in Rome trattorias.

[] proposes to put these men to work in the following manner: HTCRUBBY is in constant need of fresh employees, and the Propaganda Committee is always in need of material to publish in QKPALING. [] will undoubtedly need men with army training and just plain good allround workmen once the campsite being established has gotten under way. Heretofore these able-bodied men have had an excuse not to take this job or that one; the reason has always been the same - language limitations. The writer proposes to remove this barrier by opening a language school. In short, he proposes that all desirable, able-bodied and sound of mind Albanians now being supported by HTCURIO in one way or another, and who are not now employed at some NCFA task, will attend this language school six days per week to learn English and French. [] uses the word "desirable" because there are some elements which it would not be advisable to employ under any circumstances. The majority of these fall in the category of political chieftains' "spies", who would probably do little more than foment trouble within NCFA's ranks.) He estimates that within six months' time material which can be useful in BGFIEND's operations will start coming out of the other end of the hopper.

Such an activity would keep these men occupied and it would also be of benefit to BGFIEND from the very outset because the writer intends that textbook material would be translations for the Propaganda Committee, which has become so overburdened that it has been necessary to employ persons outside the Propaganda Committee in order to keep up with the work load.

To run the school, [] has thought of M. Frasheri, daughter of Medhi Bey Frasheri and ex-wife of Ihsan Toptani, who has handled some translations for the Propaganda Committee in recent months to the complete satisfaction of all concerned. If it were found that M. Frasheri did not have the necessary qualifications or was not available for the assignment, then [] would search elsewhere for a suitable instructor. It would be [] plan to have the instructor work directly under the control of [] grading students in the customary schoolroom fashion and keeping this office fully advised of their progress and conduct.

Any individual possessing the necessary qualifications who refused to attend this activity, or otherwise make himself available for duty, would be removed from the payroll. It would then be up to his political chieftain to support him out of his (the political chieftain's) fixed subsidy, or the individual would have to enter a displaced persons camp.

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4. Discontinue the practice of employing only those individuals acceptable to the political leaders. Such practices only encourage the politicians to continue the pursual of their 40-40-20 ratio policy which has been such a handicap to us in the past. Supersede this practice by a revised policy under which we make it understood that operational personnel will be employed on the basis of merit alone.

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5. Increase the salaries of NCEA working personnel. At this point, and in all fairness, the writer feels compelled to make this recommendation. The sums being paid the working members of NCEA, Rome, are not sufficient to allow those members to live decently. In the writer's opinion, this should be corrected. It is well and good to tell an Albanian that he is working for his country's liberation and to insist that he put in working hours comparable to those of the Rome BGFIEND staff. However, it is quite another thing to make him do it in a happy frame of mind, particularly when he sees other members of NCEA do nothing but sit in coffee houses and draw as much or more support from the PBPRIMES. It is also generally known that Hasan Dosti and Nuci Kotta receive an extra \$100.00 per month living allowance in New York and that men engaged in similar work in Athens make \$250.00 per month, compared to the \$100.00 and \$150.00 rates of pay prevailing in Rome. For these reasons, [] strongly recommends that an additional \$50.00 per month salary be granted to those members who are actually producing for NCEA.

6. Relegate the NCEA Executive Committee to a policy level only and place all operational activities directly under PBPRIME control. For three years the PBPRIMES have been patient, understanding, and have tried sincerely to make a respectable and forceful body out of NCEA. The time has come when we must now admit that it is highly unlikely that NCEA, as a whole, can ever be anything other than an organization back of which we can conduct operations to gain our aims. Abaz Kupi, individually, for example, may be of future use to us as a fighting chieftain, but he is of little use to us as a member of NCEA other than as a name which we can trade upon. Thus, let us use him to the utmost in this light. Coldly speaking, let us make him think he has a big role to play in NCEA but let us keep him outside the area of operations, in which he can only muddy the water, at best.

Thus, under such a system PBPRIMES would assume the sole control of personnel involved in operations. The Committee would be completely divorced from JBPARSON, QKPALING, KMBUMPSY, or any other operational activity, just as they have been removed from all administrative control of HTGRUEBY, where Daytopher has been appointed managing director, succeeding to Ihsan Toptani. (Since this report was drafted the Committee has been advised that it has no further control over JBPARSON.)

7. As previously stated, there is every indication that NCEA leaders will not agree upon a broadening of their ranks to include elements now outside the Committee. This situation might be overcome by a dictum from the Committee's backers, but such a move would not appear advisable at this particular time, for a number of reasons. First, we do have an investment to be considered - not only in the dollars put into the Committee, but in the standing the Committee enjoys, particularly within the country, where it appears that word of the Committee's behavior has not penetrated. Second, it is the only instrument presently at our disposal which might be used as a bargaining tool with Tito and as a front back

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of which to conduct our clandestine activities. Third, in spite of the present attitude of disgust displayed toward the Balli Kombetar by the ZRCROWNS, the writer doubts that the ZRCROWNS would even consider standing alongside the PBPRIMES in a showdown calculated to force the Balli Kombetar to accept a broadening of NCPA.

For these reasons it is deemed advisable, outwardly, at least, to allow NCPA to remain as it is for the present. At the same time, it is proposed that immediate steps be taken by the PBPRIMES, not only to tighten their control of the Committee itself (as outlined in the foregoing pages), but to strengthen and solidify their position among all important exile elements who might play a part in Albania's liberation or conceivably participate in the government of the post-liberated state. The writer views this as important for these reasons:

A. At present, at least, it appears that Albania's liberation may well come about under the auspices of the Yugoslavs. Thus, the PBPRIME bargaining position, to a degree, will hinge upon PBPRIME control of exile elements which can either contribute materially toward projected operations or are needed to maintain control over the populace once the liberation has been accomplished. These facts would seem to be borne out by effort currently being made by the Yugoslavs to recruit persons falling within these categories.

B. The road down which NCPA is traveling at present can only result in alienating its members from important personages outside the Committee who have no intention of leaving Albania's fate to the hands of NCPA or any of the political parties within NCPA. With the possible exception of Said Kryeziu, the important members of NCPA are obviously bent on this course, and it is their hope to tie the ZRCROWN-PBPRIMES with a program which will either project them into office as a Balli Kombetar-dominated coalition government or sweep the ZRCROWN-PBPRIMES down to defeat along with themselves. (While Abaz Kupa is regarded as a loyal follower of ex-King Zog in most circles, the professors claim they have executed a secret agreement with Kupa under which he will switch his allegiance to that party if Zog does not regain the throne. Under the terms of this agreement it is said Kupa will serve the coalition government as a senior statesman advisor but not as an active participant. In return, it is stated that Kupa will not be subject to the many reforms the professors intend to accomplish once they gain control of the government.)

C. General unrest among the prominent Albanians outside NCPA is growing to alarming proportions. Political gerrymandering is an essential part of the Albanian's existence, and much of this activity conducted during association with NCPA has been considered of a rather harmless, although sometimes troublesome, nature. Now, however, the situation is rapidly changing. The old coffee-housing tempo, so symbolic of the Albanian exiles' general unrest and disagreement with his more fortunate countrymen, has taken on a note of panic. Perhaps a large share of this is due to the activities of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, it is generally known that Zog has been dealing with the Yugoslavs, and there is a growing suspicion on the part of some of his followers that he has failed to impress the Yugoslavs and that they must look elsewhere for their individual salvation. True to Albanian custom, some elements have also read some encouragement into the election of Papagos - which may or may not have foundation. Nevertheless, there is growing belief

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in some circles that the Albanians outside Jugoslavia and NCFA might well consider a unified approach to the Papagos government.

9.. It is with these things in mind that the writer advances the belief that the time has come for the PBPRIMES to gather, if possible, the elements we may later wish to have at our disposal under our protective wing. He also views this as the propitious moment to distribute our eggs in as many baskets as possible. He would propose the following steps be considered to accomplish this:

A. Insofar as a dependable tool (in a position of influence within NCFA is concerned) Said Kryeziu is our most logical candidate. He is outnumbered by his cohorts four-to-one and has been relegated to a minority role in the distribution of welfare funds and political patronage by his numerically stronger associates, but he does have some standing with most of the important political elements outside the immediate group surrounding ex-King Zog. Kryeziu enjoys this standing largely because he has continuously advocated the broadening of NCFA's ranks, not entirely out of love for the elements to be included in such a broadening, but primarily to strengthen his position within NCFA's executive body through the inclusion of anti-Balli Kombetar individuals who would stand with him in opposing that group's efforts to capture the organization.

The writer proposes to capitalize upon Kryeziu's position by having Kryeziu remain within NCFA but, at the same time, organize all those important political parties and individuals now outside NCFA (and of our choosing) into a united front in which they would retain their political identity but would dedicate their efforts toward uniting all the worthy Albanian forces now outside the Committee under one banner. Such an organization would be clandestinely supported by the PBPRIMES and would agree to certain stipulations placing them completely under PBPRIME control (and without outside alliances unless specifically approved by the PBPRIMES). Thus, we would have not only all individuals and groups at our disposal for operational and bargaining purposes if and when the need occurs, but we would also have at our command a larger group (in exile numbers, at least) than the combined strength of Balli Kombetar and the Legalitet, still supported by the ZRCROWN-PBPRIMES through NCFA. The very fact that the leader of this group would be a member of NCFA's Executive Committee would, in effect, give the group a far stronger voice in NCFA affairs than that now enjoyed by Kryeziu because of the weaker organization he represents within the Committee.

B. It is proposed that this group be supported by outright subsidy to the various political factions rather than our becoming involved in the entanglements we have experienced in our dealings with NCFA. Thus, Ali Klissura, for example, would be given a subsidy from which he would support his various and sundry henchmen solely on his guarantee that he control these forces in keeping with our wishes. Aside from this political subsidy, a small sum would be allocated to the organization for the publication of a newspaper and a news bulletin - two activities deemed most essential to the success of the entire enterprise, at least at the outset, when activities will be largely of a propaganda nature anyway. For this entire activity the writer estimates that an overall expenditure of \$60,000 per annum is required. And it should be added that for some months he has worked quietly in determining the

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feasibility of such an undertaking, and his recommendations and cost estimates are based upon fact and not upon fancy.

9. These, in the main, constitute the writer's suggestions for improving the position of HECURIO in the Albanian political field - but the question is logically asked, "What about the ZRCROWNS?"

In the opinion of the writer, all of the above recommendations, taken either collectively or individually, can only improve our position with the ZRCROWNS. To begin with, the ZRCROWNS have always been critical of what they termed the free spending policy of the PEPRIME. They will see in these moves (tighter financial controls) a possible weakening of PEPRIME prestige and a strengthening of the ZRCROWN position. Thus, the ZRCROWNS will be taken unaware, feeling that the PEPRIME's move is calculated to economize, rather than strengthen our position. Once we have completed our overhauling, the ZRCROWNS can only respect us for having achieved an end which they themselves have sought to gain without success. Thus, the ZRCROWNS are calculated to endeavor to promote a closer working relationship, since it will be most apparent that the PEPRIME are wholly in control of the situation.

10. If the writer could leave the reader with one important thought it would be this: Sooner or later PEPRIME will be faced with the problem of picking a horse in this race for Albania; the sooner we get ourselves in a position to pick that horse (or dope him before the start of the race), the surer we are of winning the race. Dosti does not have the qualifications of leadership. It doesn't exist within the Committee. It may exist somewhere among the exile elements unknown to the writer, but the chances are we don't know the man. In all probability, a leader will emerge from the blue who will be surrounded by some of the elder statesmen now at our disposal but not now committed to side with us in the future. Until that man emerges, let us corral these elements and pocket the winner when the race does get under way. And let us remember that these men have a good trading value if the fate of picking the winner falls to, let us say, Tito.

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